1) Question for Prof. Raskin:

You testified that *Citizens United* merely allowed corporate CEOs to speak with treasury funds. Did it not also allow individual citizens to associate and combine resources in the corporate form to participate more effectively in the political process?

Response:

No, that had nothing to do with *Citizens United* because we already had that right as individual citizens. In *F.E.C. v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life*, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), the Supreme Court determined that individual citizens have a constitutional right to associate and combine resources in the corporate form in order to participate in the political process. *Citizens United* added nothing to this well-established First Amendment right of the people, but simply gave CEOs the power to use corporate treasury funds to spend *other people’s money* advocating for or against candidates in political campaigns. That has nothing to do with the political free speech rights of the people.

In *Massachusetts Citizens for Life*, the Court held that the general ban on corporate treasury spending “in connection with” federal elections, found in Section 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), could not be applied to the political campaign spending of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, a nonprofit corporation organized to participate in the political process and to advance a legislative agenda. The group’s purpose was “to foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through educational, political, and other forms of activities.” *Mass. Citizens for Life*, 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986) (quoting App. 84).

When Massachusetts Citizens for Life published and distributed materials in the 1978 election cycle promoting “pro-life” candidates, the FEC brought an action against the group alleging that its spending violated FECA’s ban on corporate political spending, but the Supreme Court found this ban in violation of the First Amendment as applied to this nonprofit corporation because it burdened speech by citizens acting politically through the corporate form without advancing any “compelling justification” for such burden. *Id* at 263.

Significantly, the *Massachusetts Citizens for Life* Court found that the generally compelling rationale for excluding corporate spending from politics is missing when the participating entity is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized for political purposes. As the court put it, “The concern underlying the regulation of corporate political activity – that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in
the political marketplace"—is simply absent. 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a nonprofit political corporation, Massachusetts Citizens for Life “was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital.” Id at 259.

Thus, if the justification being offered for Citizens United is to “allow individual citizens to associate and combine resources in the corporate form to participate more effectively in the political process,” as the question posits, then this justification is hollow and specious because all Americans already had that right. Without a rationale for the decision that explains specifically why the managers of for-profit business corporations must have the power to spend corporate treasury resources on political campaigning—the power, that is, to convert economic wealth amassed in business by a corporation into political finance capital—we are left with the implication that five justices on the Court overturned multiple constitutional precedents, see, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding as constitutional a state law that prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures to support or oppose a political candidate); McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (finding limitations on the corporate and union funding of “electioneering communications” to be facially constitutional), and struck down dozens of federal and state laws, all simply in order to increase the political power of corporate executives and the candidates they may choose to fund.

If any speech-related justification for the decision can be imagined, it must be to increase the overall quantity of political spending for speech regardless of the corporate or institutional identity of the source, but that dangerously expansive rationale would require the Court to strike down not only the ban on corporate political spending and contributions but also the ban on spending and contributions by foreigners in our politics, something the Court has already declined to do. Bluman v. F.E.C., 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (affirming that federal, state, and local governments can exclude foreign citizens from funding campaigns in American elections). Furthermore, this sweeping rationale—maximizing the quantity of speech without regard to the identity of the speaker—would also require the Court to strike down the ban on foreign government spending in our politics, the ban on federal, state and local government spending and contributions in our campaigns, the ban on conduit contributions, the ban on spending and contributions by five year olds and newborns, the ban on anonymous spending, and the ban on criminal money entering our political campaigns through independent expenditures. 2 U.S.C.S. §§ 441e (2014); 2 U.S.C.S. §§ 441i, 452 (2014); 2 U.S.C.S. § 441(a)(8) (2014); 2 U.S.C.S. § 434(b) (2014); 2 U.S.C.S. 441k (2014); 11 CFR 110.4(b)(2)(i). All of these readily available pools of political finance capital have been kept away from elections because we have properly defined them as being at odds with the compelling purposes of democratic self-government, political equality, and the integrity of representative and judicial institutions. But if speech is speech and all of it is protected regardless of the “identity of the speaker,” as the Court majority has found, Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010), surely all of them must be allowed.

In any event, there is no individual free speech justification for empowering corporate management in private for-profit, joint-stock business corporations to spend shareholders’ money advocating political causes and candidates, and Citizens United has nothing to do with the expressive political freedoms of the people.
2) Question for Prof. Raskin and Mr. Abrams:

Prof. Raskin cited *Ward v. Rock Against Racism* in support of the view that there were no First Amendment implications for government to prevent people from drowning out the speech of other people. That case involved a time, place, or manner restriction on the volume of speech through municipal payment for a sound system and a technician to control music at decibels not disturbing to other citizens. The Court upheld the arrangement because it was made “without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [was] narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that [it] le[ft] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” In the proposed constitutional amendment, speech is being limited precisely because of its content, it is not narrowly tailored to achieve any significant governmental interest, and it vastly curtails alternative channels of communication. Does *Ward* really have any bearing on S.J. Res. 19?

Response:

Yes, it does. *Ward v. Rock Against Racism* and other decisions upholding reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions teach us that, in a democracy, we often have to limit the volume and quantity of speech at certain times in certain places in order to achieve other significant public interests, including especially the vindication of the free speech rights of other speakers, the efficacy of democratic self-government, and the integrity of representative and judicial institutions. The Amendment will simply make this (painfully obvious) principle clear in the context of campaign contributions and spending, allowing us to restore some balance to an area that the Supreme Court majority has trampled with its lopsided and activist interventions on behalf of plutocratic power.

The principle at the heart of *Ward* is so obvious and ubiquitous as to be banal. At the Judiciary Committee Hearing on June 3, each witness was given only five minutes to testify before the buzzer went off. I know that all of us had a lot more to say, but the five-minute restriction was not only perfectly constitutional but also reasonable and, to a certain extent, inevitable. Moreover, there were surely a lot of other people in the audience who wished to testify, but the rules of the Senate and the Committee properly structured the discussion to allow for the ventilation of major schools of thought through a handful of witnesses. The idea that any of these rules created a First Amendment violation is just silly. The same principle governs the practices of the very Supreme Court that handed down *Citizens United* and *Buckley v. Valeo*, where the majority professed that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). In fact, the parties appearing before the Court in *Buckley*, like all other Supreme Court litigants, were strictly allotted a period of argument time to facilitate an orderly dialogue in which all parties could be fairly heard. The Court created opportunities not for unrestricted and unequal speech but for tightly restricted and equal speech precisely to give both sides a fair chance and to systematically illuminate the issues for the Court. No one else from the outside was allowed to speak, no matter how eloquent, important or affluent they were. The U.S. House of Representatives also conducts its normal business on the
floor according to rigid allotments of time for debate, as does the Senate, where even the occasional filibuster can be shut down in the world’s greatest deliberative body with the appropriate number of votes.

It is these speech-limiting rules which actually make speech audible, intelligible, meaningful, and effective. They are replete not just in federal but in state and local legislatures and courts, where the central action of democratic self-government takes place, and they dominate in elections themselves, where the Supreme Court has permitted states to ban all electioneering within a certain distance of polling places, to prevent write-in ballots, to impose rather dramatic restrictions on candidates’ access to a position the ballot, and also to limit participation in televised government-sponsored debates to the most “viable” political candidates in order to prevent “cacophony.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Burdick v Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 982 F.2d 289 (1992). Whatever the merits of each of these decisions—and in most of them I think the Supreme Court tilted wrongly against greater inclusion of more voices and openness—the principle was generally accepted that opportunities for political speech may be, indeed must be, structured by law to permit for meaningful debate and effective self-government.

Now, I invoked Ward v. Rock Against Racism because it will be reasonably pointed out that the rules for structured debate and argument in our governmental and formal electoral institutions do not necessarily apply to political expression “in the street.” Whereas “the room will not hold all” at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, everyone should be able to speak to his or her heart’s content in the political world outside the halls of power. In other words, there are structured formal contexts which call for regulation because there are only possibilities for limited and finite speech within them and there are unstructured informal contexts which call for deregulation because there are possibilities there (theoretically anyway) for infinite speech.

This distinction has great validity, and the basic First Amendment principle for political speech in the public forum is the excellent one that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . .” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). However, the Supreme Court has paired this principle with the corresponding principle of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Ward, “Even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 491 U.S. 781 at 791. He emphasized that the regulation “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so.” Ward, id. at 798.

Therefore, when the Court comes to examine the constitutionality of campaign contribution and expenditure limits under the new Amendment, it will follow generally the Ward analysis as informed by the new constitutional language. The first question will be whether the limits actually advance any of the significant and compelling ends of democratic self-government, political equality, and the integrity of representative institutions, which are the textually identified purposes of the Amendment. If not, the limits will be outside of the power of
Congress and the states. If so, the question then becomes whether the limits are targeted at the viewpoint or content of the speech that may be limited by the expenditure or contribution caps, rather than these other ends. If they are targeted at the political viewpoint, message or subject matter, then they will be invalid under the First Amendment because they will not be "reasonable"; if they are targeted effectively, and in a viewpoint and content-neutral way, at the ways in which the big money system corrupts officeholders and distorts their time and attention, shakes down private citizens, entrenches plutocracy and inequality, or undermines the integrity of representative relationships, then they will be valid. If so, then the Court will look, finally, to see whether the regulation leaves open "ample alternatives channels for communication."

The last prong relating to "ample alternative channels for communication" has a dramatically different contextual meaning in the age of the Internet. The worldwide web actually makes a wide-open and unlimited marketplace of ideas far more of a reality than ever it was before, and everyone—from a pauper to a billionaire—can quite readily access the Internet and express him or herself on an uncensored, unrestricted and free and continuous basis, which is one reason why the doleful complaints about the censorship of a handful of billionaires who want to spend tens of millions of dollars purchasing more political power and influence are so tinny and off-point in this discussion. In the Internet age, there are always "alternative channels of communication" available for everyone, including billionaire political activists. The ease with which people can ceaselessly communicate their views places the campaign finance demands of billionaire tycoons in the proper light: they are not seeking the opportunity to speak endlessly, for this they already enjoy like the rest of us. They are seeking rather the opportunity to use their wealth to dominate the public discourse and agenda in ways that are not remotely available to the vast majority of citizens and that reflect not a concern for expression but for power.

Let us imagine how different laws might be treated under the Amendment.

If Congress and the states were to categorically ban corporate contributions and expenditures under the new Amendment—that is, to renew the Tillman Act, which hangs by a doctrinal thread today, and to revive the now-invalidated bans on corporate political spending—all of this would almost certainly pass muster because there is a long history of pre-Citizens United Supreme Court jurisprudence affirming that democratic self-government requires that states be permitted to build a wall of separation between corporate treasury wealth and democratic elections. The ban would apply, as the Tillman Act does today, on a viewpoint and content-neutral basis: it prevents corporate contributions both to Democratic candidates and to Republican candidates (and others) and by businesses whose CEOs who believe that climate change is the world’s most pressing problem and whose who believe it is a complete fiction. This, in fact, is the very heart of the Amendment’s meaning: to allow our political democracy to operate free from plutocratic distortion regardless of the content or viewpoint of the agenda being pressed.

Thus, if the Amendment passes, Montana could reenact its popular Corrupt Practices Act, which forbade all corporate political spending in connection with candidate campaigns and was struck down in Western Tradition Partnership v. Montana in the wake of Citizens United. W. Tradition P’ship v. Mont. Attorney Gen., 2010 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412 (2010). The Act, which
was overturned by the categorical and utterly fact-resistant ideology of *Citizens United*, would almost certainly be upheld under the 28th Amendment.

Montana first passed its Corrupt Practices Act in 1912 after decades of experience with naked political domination of its legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government by mining and industrial corporations that purchased political free rein to exploit the state’s mineral and natural resources. The law drew upon more than a century of jurisprudential understanding that corporations are artificial entities endowed with enormous state-created privileges for economic purposes and do not enjoy the political speech or spending rights of the people. By its terms, the new Amendment would revive the power to distinguish between real people and corporations and thus empower Montana to renew its old ban on corporate spending in campaigns. This is not a content-based speech suppression; it is a constitutional policy statement that business corporations chartered for economic reasons play a completely different role in society than citizens do and should not be able to convert their economic advantages into self-perpetuating political power over everyone else. Such a ban is narrowly tailored, indeed surgically targeted, to remove the corporate threat to democratic self-government, political equality, free and fair markets undistorted by rent-seeking operations, and the basic integrity of representative institutions.

However, if Congress and the states were to ban corporate or personal expenditures of over $100,000 denying the existence of climate change, this would violate the First Amendment as a clear case of viewpoint discrimination. *See RAV v. St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)(“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . or even expressive conduct . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”). If they sought to ban any expenditures dealing with the question of climate change, this too would violate the First Amendment as a content or subject matter-based regulation. *See Police Dept. of Chic. v. Mosley*, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (“But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”) (emphasis added).

Now take a different scenario. Imagine that West Virginia passes a law responding to the judicial election money scandal at the center of *Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868 (2009), by limiting any independent expenditures, corporate or personal, in state judicial elections to $100,000. Would such a law, in fact, limit speech “because of its content,” as the question suggests, and in a way that is “not narrowly tailored to achieve any significant governmental interest” and that “vastly curtails alternative channels of communication”?

The hypothetical West Virginia law would be in response to the real-world expenditure in 2004 of more than $3 million dollars in a judicial election by the CEO of the Massey Corporation, Don Blankenship, who was disgruntled with a $50 million verdict handed down by a jury against his company for fraud, concealment and tortious interference with contract in its business dealings. Blankenship’s spending went to pay for nasty television ads against a sitting judge and to promote a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals candidate, Brent Benjamin, who won the race and then promptly came to cast the deciding judicial vote to overturn the $50 million verdict against Massey. This appalling sequence of events was the basis for Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in *Caperton* overturning the state court decision on Due Process
grounds and holding that the vast campaign spending of Mr. Blankenship created a “probability of bias” in Justice Benjamin’s jurisprudence, compromising in appearance, if not in reality, the ability of the plaintiffs to receive a fair hearing in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.

To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts asked 40 penetrating and skeptical questions about this decision in his dissenting opinion in Massey Coal, such as: “1. How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a ‘probability of bias’? 2. How do we determine whether a given expenditure is ‘disproportionate’? Disproportionate to what? 3. Are independent, non-coordinated expenditures treated the same as direct contributions to a candidate’s campaign? What about contributions to independent outside groups supporting a candidate? . . . 9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received ‘disproportionate’ support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that issue? . . . 13. Must the judge’s vote be outcome-determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute a due process violation? . . . 32. Are contributions or expenditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in the general election?” Id. at 888 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). And so on.

To my mind, these questions do not undermine the integrity or logic of the decision but rather demonstrate that there will be awesomely complicated and intractable line-drawing questions if the Court is forced to revisit judicial and legislative decisions after the fact to determine whether certain spending in judicial races is so massive and egregious as to thwart due process. Rather, the proper answer to these questions is that the legislative branch should set reasonable and well-understood limits in advance to guarantee standards of proportion and fairness in campaign spending that are consistent with democratic self-government, political equality and representative integrity. Running around after the fact to try to determine if certain spending was too great, or the corruption is too apparent and egregious, is a fool’s errand and wholly unworkable, as Chief Justice Roberts shrewdly suggests.

A $100,000 limit would still have allowed Blankenship to spend more than anyone else in the state did and to get his message out in a powerful and unmistakable way. This $100,000 worth of spending—when combined with direct campaign contributions and the powerful free resource of the Internet, to which nearly all citizens have access—would still likely leave Blankenship’s voice as the loudest in the state but it would prevent him from spending so much as to create the reality or appearance of such vastly disproportionate and decisive political dominance that it would violate Due Process to permit his chosen candidate to render judgment on his business interests in a court case.

A law with a $100,000 limit would target not the content or viewpoint of the speech but its quantity or volume, much like the volume of the speech that the Rock against Racism organizers had to adjust in Central Park so that other citizens could simply be heard in the park. There are plainly significant and compelling interests—democratic self-government, political equality, and the reality and appearance of judicial integrity and fairness, not to mention saving the time of the courts from having to repeatedly adjudicate whether certain campaign expenditures are so egregious as to compromise Due Process—to justify such laws if they are appropriately tailored and leave open other ample channels of communication. After maxing out on his $100,000, a sum that the vast majority of Wet Virginians could only dream of spending in
a judicial election (even if they had an important case pending relating to millions of dollars or something like, say, child custody), Blankenship could still spend to the heavens generally warning people of the dangers of too much regulation or the fraud of global climate change. The Amendment would thus allow the people of West Virginia to treat a tycoon’s candidate-focused political expenditures as the equivalent of campaign contributions, which is precisely how Justice Kennedy, perhaps unconsciously, treated them in his analysis. See Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 at 901 (2009) (referring in passing to Blankenship’s spending as “contributions” to Justice Benjamin when in fact the vast majority of money spent was, legally speaking, in the form of independent expenditures).

Remember that New York City’s requirement that Rock Against Racism use the City’s sound technician and turn the music down actually did restrict the “volume” and “quantity” of the speech and thus, theoretically, the number of people who could get the group’s message. But the Supreme Court found that the restriction had “nothing to do with content” because it applied not only to rock music but to classical and jazz, it served the important interest of allowing people to pursue the other valuable activities going on in Central Park, thus promoting free expression, and it left open lots of other avenues for Rock Against Racism to get its message out in other contexts. In other words, it was perfectly “reasonable.” This is pure common sense.

Obviously a court looking at a $100,000 limit on spending on judicial campaigns in West Virginia would have to examine all of the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine its reasonableness. But one can well imagine it being deemed constitutional.

In Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court took these questions off of the table of democracy by categorically rejecting any corporate and individual spending limits as a direct “quantity restriction” on speech. After McCutcheon, the Court also seems to be directly on course to invalidate contribution limits, which end up being, according to the accelerating new dogma, a kind of expenditure limit too. (If you could give me $1 million but are limited to $5,200, my ability to spend the extra $994,800 has just been stifled.) In order to get back to a Ward-style analysis of campaign finance laws, where reasonableness governs, we need to pass the 28th Amendment, restoring and assuring to Congress and the states the power to set reasonable limits on contributions and expenditures in order to advance democratic self-governance, political equality, and the integrity of government and electoral democracy.

I also cited Ward v. Rock Against Racism to demonstrate that if the Supreme Court majority were not under the spell of a new market fundamentalism in the campaign finance field, it could find ample doctrinal resources in First Amendment law today with which to uphold traditional campaign finance laws protecting democratic self-government from big money domination. It can no longer do so because it has committed itself to a series of dogmas that leave no room for doctrinal, much less democratic political, maneuver: money is speech; corporations have the political free speech rights of the people; the only acceptable interest for limiting the flow of money in campaign finance is to prevent corruption; corruption must be tantamount to bribery; and it violates the free speech rights of privately financed candidates to increase the speech opportunities for publicly financed candidates.
While campaign money flows freely, the Court has put political and legislative democracy in a straitjacket. The Court has eliminated recognition of the compelling interests that Congress and the states have in promoting democratic self-government, political equality and the integrity of representative institutions. It has reduced the anti-corruption interest to meaninglessness. It has come close to abolishing the distinction between natural persons and corporate entities that has been central to campaign finance regulation for more than a century. And it has disabled the power of states to create strong public financing mechanisms that actually work to expand speech, debate, competition and participation.

It will take a constitutional amendment to restore a balance so that our law resembles something like *Ward v. Rock against Racism* in the campaign finance field.